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Abstract
A new literature studies the use of capital controls to prevent financial crises.
Within this new framework, we show that when exchange rate policy is costless, there
is no need for capital controls. However, if exchange rate policy entails efficiency costs,
capital controls become part of the optimal policy mix. When exchange rate policy
is costly, the optimal mix combines prudential capital controls in tranquil times with
policies that limit exchange rate depreciation in crisis times. The optimal mix yields
more borrowing, fewer and less severe financial crises, and much higher welfare than
with capital controls alone.
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1 Introduction
In response to the global financial crisis and its costly aftermath, a new policy paradigm
emerged in which old fashioned government policies such as capital controls and other re-
strictions on credit flows became part of the standard crisis prevention policy toolkit (the
so called macro-prudential policies). A few, large emerging market economies experimented
with these tools. And even the traditionally conservative IMF changed its orthodox views
on capital controls, advocating the use of such measures when other tools are not available
or have run their course of action—see Blanchard and Ostry (2012) and IMF (2012).
The key rationale underpinning the use of capital controls is financial stability.1, 2 The
financial stability motive is the focus of the influential contributions of Korinek (2010) and
Bianchi (2011).3 Their analysis is based on variants of a common theoretical framework pro-
posed by Mendoza (2002, 2010). In this framework, the scope for policy intervention arises
because of a pecuniary externality stemming from the presence of a key relative price in the
collateral constraint faced by private agents. In this environment, prudential interventions
(i.e. before a financial crisis occurs) may be desirable because they can make agents inter-
nalize the consequences of this externality on their individual decisions. Capital controls in
this setting can discourage financial excesses, reduce the amount that agents borrow, thereby
lowering the probability of a financial crisis, and hence enhance welfare.
In this paper, we provide an integrated analysis of alternative policy tools that can be
interpreted in terms of fiscal, monetary and macroprudential policies using the same model
1Blanchard and Ostry (2012) make explicit reference to the pecuniary externality perspective when
motivating the IMF’s view on the use of capital controls: ”If there are external effects from foreign borrowing
(think of amplified crisis risks for the country, where the risks are not internalized by the borrower), then
capital controls can act as Pigouvian taxes and constitute an optimal response at the country level, helping
agents to internalize the external effects of their borrowing”.
2Historically, as documented by Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2011), capital controls have been adopted
for fear of capital flows reversal, fear of excessive risk taking, and to contain asset price bubbles. Other
traditional reasons include concerns for competitiveness and monetary policy independence—see more on
these below.
3See also Lorenzoni (2008), Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2012, 2013) and Benigno
et al. (2013).
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economy studied by Bianchi (2011). A first main finding is that, when financial stability
is the sole motive for policy intervention, the optimal policy design aims at supporting the
value of the collateral and hence the agents’ borrowing capacity during crises times. In
this context, policies that support the real exchange rate (or more generally collateral price
support policies) during a financial crisis dominates by a large margin prudential controls on
capital flows from a welfare point of view. The dominance of price support policies relies,
perhaps unrealistically, on the assumption that they are costless to use. Indeed, under the
assumption that supporting the value of collateral during crisis times is costly, it becomes
optimal to combine price support policies with macroprudential policies such as capital
controls.
In our analysis, then, the rationale for macroprudential policies relies on the extent to
which price support policies are cost-effective rather than the amount that agents borrow in
the unregulated economy during tranquil times. This novel element emphasizes the interac-
tion between ex-ante (normal times) and ex-post (crises times) policy interventions: when
price support policy is fully effective in crises times (i.e. it is able to address the pecuniary
externality distortion at no other cost) there is no scope for ex-ante policy intervention.
However, if the policy is costly in crises times, it is optimal to adopt capital controls during
normal times as a way to limit the occurrence of the crises, combined with price support
policies in crises times to mitigate their severity. A second main finding is that the optimal
combination of ex ante and ex post policy interventions achieves welfare gains of 1.10% of
tradable consumption relative to the unregulated economy, which is much higher than the
typical value found in the literature.
The vehicle to convey our messages is the the same model economy used by Bianchi
(2011). This is a two-sector (tradables and nontradables) small open, endowment economy
with an occasionally binding international borrowing constraint. Quantitatively, this model
has been successful in reproducing the business cycle and the crisis dynamics properties of
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a typical emerging market economy. In this class of models, a financial crisis event (also
labelled a Sudden Stop in capital or credit flows) occurs when the constraint binds. In our
model, the value of total current income generated both in the tradable and nontradeable
sectors limits borrowing, denominated in units of tradable consumption. When the borrowing
constraint binds, the decline in the relative price of nontradables generates a balance sheet
effect and leads to a Fisherian debt-deflation spiral.
In this economy, there is a well defined scope for government intervention, but there
are multiple instruments or tools with which policy could be conducted. The pecuniary
externality arises from the fact that individual agents do not internalize the aggregate effect
of their borrowing decisions on the relative price of nontradable goods, which is the price
that enters the collateral constraint. There are three type of taxes that can be used to
correct it: a tax/subsidy on foreign debt or a tax/subsidy on tradable consumption and a
tax/subsidy on nontradable consumption. The tax on foreign debt is usually interpreted
as a capital control, while taxes on either tradable or nontradable consumption can be
interpreted as a real exchange rate interventions because they affect directly the relative
price of nontradables.4 Our policy analysis considers all three instruments and studies their
relative effectiveness in welfare terms. Differently from the existing literature, this paper
conducts the policy analysis following a Ramsey optimal taxation approach, assuming that
the government budget is always balanced.
The paper first studies the Ramsey problem when capital controls are the only policy
tool available, and the government budget constraint is balanced through lump-sum trans-
fers/taxes. Consistent with Bianchi (2011) and Korinek (2010), in this case, the finding is
that it is Ramsey optimal to limit the amount that agents borrow in normal times, while
no action is needed during crises times. The reason why capital controls are not used by
4The interpretation of the relative price of nontradables as the real exchange rate is standard in the
literature. See for instance Bianchi (2011), Caballero and Lorenzoni (2014), Mendoza (2002), Korinek (2010),
and Jeanne (2012). Alternatively, the consumption taxes (subsidies) could be interpreted more literally as
domestic fiscal policy tools.
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the Ramsey planner in crisis times is that, in this model, they cannot affect the allocation
when a crisis occurs (i.e. when the borrowing constraint binds). Thus, in this setting, when
capital controls are the only policy tool available, the best that the government can do is to
reduce the probability that a crisis occurs by inducing the private sector to borrow less than
in the decentralized equilibrium.
Next, the paper shows that a policy of supporting the real exchange rate during crisis
times by relaxing the borrowing constraint when it binds, can achieve a much higher level of
welfare. In fact, such a policy can undo the borrowing constraint completely and, as a result,
support an equilibrium in which agents behave as if they were in an unconstrained allocation.
Importantly, as we shall see, this policy is time-consistent. The policy can be implemented
with a subsidy on non tradable consumption or a tax on tradable consumption. The result
hinges on the ability of the Ramsey planner to manipulate the value of collateral with
consumption taxes or subsidies that affect the relative price of nontradable goods without
creating any other distortions. Indeed, since these consumption taxes or subsidies are rebated
or financed through lump-sum transfers or taxes, they are costless and do not entail further
distortions.
Finally the paper shows that, when lump-sum transfers/taxes are no longer available,
price support policies during crisis times become costly, and capital controls in normal times
complement exchange rate policy in crises times under the optimal policy mix. When ex-post
policies are costless they can be used all the way to remove the borrowing constraint, and
there is no need to engage in ex-ante policy interventions such as capital controls. But when
the use of ex-post policies entails efficiency losses or costs (such as when there are other
policy objectives to be traded off for financial stability), then ex-ante policy interventions
like prudential capital controls are called for to maximize welfare. Notice that this rationale
for the use of ex-ante policy interventions is not related to the amount that agents borrow
in the competitive equilibrium of the economy without government intervention. Under the
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optimal policy with both instruments, there is more borrowing, fewer and less sever crises,
and as a result much higher welfare, with gains of 1.10% of tradable consumption relative
to the unregulated economy as compared to only .41% with capital controls alone.
The paper relates to a few other recent contributions in the literature on pecuniary
externalities which focused both on ex ante and ex post policies. Benigno et al. (2013)
analyze the extent to which private agents overborrow or underborrow in a production version
of our economy. They show that the allocation chosen by a social planner away from the
crisis depends on the planner’s ability to mitigate a crisis, should one occur. Benigno et al.
(2013) do not analyze any implementation issues or optimal policy problems. Jeanne and
Korinek (2013) study the time-consistent mix of ex-ante macroprudential regulation and ex-
post bailout transfers in a three-period economy in which the relative price that enters the
borrowing constraint is an asset price. The presence of the asset price in the policy problem
opens the door to a time-consistency issue, which is their main focus and it is not present in
our model. Jeanne and Korinek (2013) also study the role of ex-ante and ex-post policies in
their model, but they restrict the set of policy tools along two dimensions: first they restrict
the use of distortionary taxation to the contingency in which the constraint binds, while we
allow the policy maker to choose freely which instrument to use both in normal and crisis
times; and second, they do not consider all the possible tools in the context of their model.
Other new theoretical approaches rationalized the use of capital controls. One approach
motivates the use of capital controls with the possibility of manipulating the intra or in-
tertemporal terms of trade—conceptually analogous to the use of tariffs to manipulate the
goods’ terms of trade (Costinot, Lorenzoni and Werning (2014) and De Paoli and Lipinska
(2013). Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016) examine the role of capital controls in an economy
with downward nominal wage rigidity and a fixed exchange rate regime. They focus on
competitiveness issues and are silent on the financial stability motive we focus on. Farhi and
Werning (2012) study capital controls as a way to address the impossibility to simultaneously
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have an open capital account, a fixed exchange regime, and an independent monetary policy
(as known as the ”impossible trilemma”). Likewise, Devereux and Yetman (2014) analyze
capital controls as a way to restore monetary policy effectiveness when the nominal interest
rate reaches the zero lower bound in a global liquidity trap context.
Other approaches have focused on the role of capital controls when there are multiple
distortions or objectives. For instance, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2015) show that re-
strictions to capital flows can be welfare improving in an economy with multiple goods,
incomplete financial markets, and inefficient production, but do not discuss issues of optimal
mix between ex-ante and ex-post interventions. Ottonello (2015) studies optimal exchange
rate policy with downward nominal wage rigidity, flexible exchange rates, and a borrowing
constraint like the one in our model. His analysis focuses on a restricted set of instruments
similar to Jeanne and Korinek (2013) and discusses the trade-offs that exchange rate policy
faces between competitiveness and financial stability considerations.
More broadly, our paper shares the emphasis on price support policies that limit the
depreciation of the real exchange rate during crisis times with the work of Chang, Cespedes
and Velasco (2012). They examine the role of other unconventional policy tools such as
credit policies and direct interventions in the foreign exchange market, but they do not
compute optimal policy and focus on the transmission mechanism of alternative policy tools.5
In an different framework, Martin and Ventura (2014) also suggest policies that relax the
collateral constraint by properly managing the size of “bubbles”. More generally, our study
of alternative policy tools is related to the work by Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2008) in
which the role of price stickiness for the design of monetary policy depends on the existence
of alternative fiscal policy tools. Finally, in terms of the solution techniques, we apply the
same algorithm proposed by Benigno et al. (2012) to solve numerically for the Markov
5In an optimizing neoclassical framework without credit frictions, Calvo, Reinhart and Vegh (1995) also
analyze the role of real exchange rate targeting as a stabilization policy tool.
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Perfect optimal policy problem in the context of a production version of our economy in
which a time-consistency issue arises.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment,
the scope for government intervention, and the alternative government instruments that we
consider. Section 3 studies optimal capital control policy. Section 4 analyzes optimal real
exchange rate policy. Section 5 considers the joint use of capital controls and real exchange
rate policies when lump-sum transfers/taxes are not available, as well as some robustness
exercises. Section 6 relates the main results of the paper to countries’s experience with capital
controls and price support policies over the past 20 years or so. Section 7 concludes. The
numerical solution methods we use as well as other technical material including proofs and
extensions are reported in an appendix for online publication, together with the computer
code for the implementation of the analysis in the paper.
2 The model environment
This section describes our model economy and discusses its key assumptions. It then char-
acterizes the competitive equilibrium of the model. Next it identifies the externality that
gives rise to scope for government intervention. And finally, it discusses the alternative
government policy instruments analyzed in the rest of the paper.
Consider a small open economy in which there is a continuum of households j ∈ [0, 1]
that maximize the utility function
U j ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
{
βtu
(
Cjt
)}
, (1)
where Cjt is the consumption basket for an individual j at time t, and is β the subjective
discount factor. E0 denotes the conditional expectation at time 0. Assume that the period
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utility function is isoelastic:
u
(
Cjt
) ≡ 1
1− ρ
(
Cjt
)1−ρ
.
The consumption basket, Ct, is a CES aggregate of tradable and nontradable goods (omitting
the subscript j to simplify notation):
Ct ≡
[
ω
1
κ
(
CTt
)κ−1
κ + (1− ω) 1κ (CNt )κ−1κ ] κκ−1 . (2)
The parameter κ is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between consumption of
tradable and nontradable goods, while ω is the relative weight of the two goods in the utility
function.
Normalizing the price of tradable goods to 1 and denoting the relative price of the non-
tradable goods with PN , the aggregate price index is given by
Pt =
[
ω + (1− ω) (PNt )1−κ] 11−κ .
Note here that there is a one-to-one link between the aggregate price index P and the relative
price PN .
Households maximize utility subject to their budget constraint (expressed in units of trad-
able consumption) and a borrowing constraint. The asset menu includes only a one-period
bond denominated in units of tradable consumption. Each household has two stochastic
endowment streams of tradable and non-tradable output, {Y Tt } and {Y Nt }. For simplicity,
assume that both {Y Tt } and {Y Nt } are Markov processes with finite, strictly positive support.
Therefore the current state of the economy can be completely characterized by the triplet
{Bt, Y Tt , Y Nt }. Thus, the budget constraint each household faces is
CTt + P
N
t C
N
t +Bt+1 = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + (1 + r)Bt, (3)
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where Bt+1 denotes the bond holding at the end of period t, and (1 + r) is the given world
gross interest rate.
Access to international financial markets is not only incomplete but also imperfect in
the sense that, by assumption, the amount that each individual can borrow is limited by a
multiple of his current total income:
Bt+1 > −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
]
. (4)
One justification of (4) is in terms of liquidity constraints. By this interpretation, lenders
require households to finance a fraction φ of their current expenses—which include con-
sumption, debt repayments and taxes—out of current income (see Mendoza (2002) for this
interpretation):
φ
(
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
) ≥ CTt + PNt CNt − (1 + r)Bt. (5)
In fact, by combining (5) with (3) we obtain (4). Another justification of (4) appeals to
an environment in which the borrower engages in fraudulent activities during the period
in which the debt is contracted and prevents creditors from seizing any future income–see
Bianchi (2011) for this interpretation. Note here that (5) depends on pre-tax income rather
than post-tax income. So, in an environment with default, the individual who defaults is
left with her/his full tax-obligation.6
At the empirical level, as Mendoza (2002) and Bianchi (2011) emphasize, a specification
in terms of current income is consistent with evidence on the determinants of access to credit
markets, on lending criteria and guidelines used in mortgage and consumer financing (e.g.,
Jappelli 1990, Jappelli and Pagano, 1989). The assumption that nontradable goods can be
pledged as collateral is consistent with the evidence reported by Tornell and Westermann
(2005) on the use of international credit to finance booms in the nontradable sector.
6See section 5 for a discussion of what happens when households can default on their tax obligation as
well, and the borrowing constraint depends on post-tax income.
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The key feature of (4) is that it captures currency mismatches in the balance sheet of
the economy—see Krugman (1999). In fact borrowing is denominated in units of tradable
consumption, while both the tradable and the nontradable endowment can be pledged as
collateral. Indeed, currency mismatches have been one of the main vulnerability of emerging
market economies in the numerous financial crises of the 1990s and the 2000s and continued
to be a crucial policy challenge in the post global financial crisis period—see for instance
Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004, 2012), Shin (2013), and Acharya et al. (2015) for a
discussion.
From a model perspective, a financial crisis occurs when the constraint binds and the
model dynamic changes nonlinearly; an event that is endogenous in the model. Yet the
long-run business cycle properties of the economy are only marginally affected by the crises
events (Mendoza, 2002, 2010). A unique feature of this model environment, therefore, is to
nest endogenous financial crisis dynamics triggered by small exogenous disturbances within
regular business cycles.
In our small open economy, the motive for borrowing arises from the assumption that
β (1 + r) < 1 so that agents are impatient compared to foreign lenders. However, we also
assume that there is a lower bound on debt strictly greater than the natural debt limit,
B > Bn, such that Bt > B, for all t.7 This lower bound guarantees that the competitive
equilibrium of the economy without government intervention and without the international
borrowing constraint (4) is well defined. In particular, it guarantees that there is an ergodic
distribution of debt with finite support, and both tradable and nontradable consumption
have a strictly positive lower bound, while the nontradable price also has finite support with
strictly positive lower bound. In order to focus on non-trivial policies, the assumption that
the competitive equilibrium allocation always violates the borrowing constraint (4) is also
7If CT and CN are strong substitutes, this constraint may bind; since the evidence is that CT and CN
are complements, this possibility is remote.
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necessary, when Bt = B, given Y
T
t and Y
N
t .
8
Note finally that, as the online appendix discusses, our calibration, and in particular
the assumption that tradable and nontradable goods are complement (κ < 1), rules out the
possibility of multiple equilibria.
2.1 Competitive equilibrium
The online appendix provides a full characterization of the competitive equilibrium of the
economy with the borrowing constraint and no government intervention. In this equilib-
rium, households maximize (1) subject to (3) and (4) by choosing CNt , C
T
t and Bt+1. The
intratemporal allocation between tradeable and non tradeable goods is given by
(
(1− ω)CTt
ω (CNt )
) 1
κ
= PNt . (6)
Goods market clearing for tradeable goods yields
CTt = Y
T
t −Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt, (7)
while for non tradeable goods it is:
CNt = Y
N
t . (8)
The quantitative properties of this equilibrium are well known (see Mendoza (2002) and
Bianchi (2011)). Here, it is important to point only out that, as Bianchi (2011) illustrated,
this very same model can account well for key business cycles statistics as well as the inci-
dence and severity of financial crises in a typical emerging market economy like Argentina.
Throughout the paper, therefore, whenever numerical methods are employed, for illustrative
purposes, all parameter values of the model are set exactly like in Bianchi (2011)—and a
8This restriction amounts to a lower bound on φ.
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summary table is reported in the online appendix.
2.1.1 Unconstrained Equilibrium
As shown later, two of the government policy instruments that we consider, when used
optimally, can completely remove the effects of the constraint (4) and achieve an allocation
that is identical to the competitive equilibrium of the model without the borrowing constraint
(4). In what follows this allocation is referred to as the ”unconstrained equilibrium” (UE)
and it is characterized in the online appendix.9
In the deterministic steady state of the model, since agents are impatient, the allocation
will tend to converge towards the natural debt limit. 10 In our stochastic economy, agents
engage in precautionary saving so that the probability of hitting the natural debt limit is
zero.
Also note that the unconstrained equilibrium characterizes an allocation in which finan-
cial markets are incomplete so that there are inefficient variations in consumption due to
the lack of state contingent debt. For completeness, the online appendix describes the first
best allocation in which agents in the small open economy have access to state contingent
securities and compare it with the unconstrained allocation.
2.2 Pecuniary externality
In order to understand the rationale for policy intervention in our model, we first follow the
recent literature—e.g., Lorenzoni (2008), Korinek (2010) and Bianchi (2011)—and focus on
a benevolent social planner problem with restricted planning abilities. The rest of the paper
then focuses on Ramsey optimal policy. In particular, start by assuming that the social
planner can directly choose the level of debt subject to the credit constraint while allowing
9The existence of a lower bound on debt which is strictly greater than the natural debt limit guarantees
that the competitive allocation without borrowing constraint has an ergodic distribution of debt with finite
support under the assumption that β(1 + r) < 1.
10In our model, this level equals (minus) the annuity value of the lowest tradable endowment value.
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goods markets to clear competitively. Unlike the representative agent in the competitive
equilibrium of the model, the social planner internalizes the effects of his/her borrowing
decisions on the equilibrium relative price of nontradables. This is relevant in our set up
because, when the constraint binds, the agents’ borrowing capacity depends on the value of
the collateral, which in turn is determined endogenously by the equilibrium relative price of
nontradables.
2.2.1 Social planning problem
Specifically, the social planner maximizes (1) subject to the same borrowing constraint (4)
that private agents face and the market clearing conditions for tradables and nontradables
goods (7) and (8). In specifying this problem, the equilibrium price of nontradables is
determined competitively according to the pricing rule (6). This condition also serves as a
constraint on the planning problem to eliminate PNt from the borrowing constraint.
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Figure 1 illustrates graphically the consequences of the presence of the borrowing con-
straint by comparing the policy functions of the endogenous variables (CTt , Bt+1, P
N
t ) for a
negative one-standard deviation shock.12 Consider the three allocations we defined above:
the competitive equilibrium with borrowing constraint (CE), the social planner problem (SP)
and the unconstrained equilibrium (UE).13
Figure 1 shows the difference between the policy functions of the constrained (CE and
SP) on the one hand and the unconstrained (UE) equilibrium allocations on the other. In
particular, the UE allocation features a much higher level of tradable consumption and
11This formulation is usually referred to as ”constrained-efficient” planning problem in the literature. A
second possibility, sometimes referred to as the ”conditionally-efficient” problem, is to determine this relative
price by imposing as a constraint on the problem the competitive equilibrium policy function (in our case
PNt = f
CE(Bt, Y
N
t , Y
T
t )). In our endowment economy, however, these two definitions give exactly the same
result and do not affect the normative analysis. See Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Lorenzoni (2008) for more
details and a discussion.
12A policy function is the non-linear equilibrium relation between the endogenous variables of the model
and its exogenous and endogenous states (in our case, the triplet
{
Bt, Y
N
t , Y
T
t
}
).
13Complete solutions for these allocations have to be computed numerically with the the global solution
methods that the online appendix describes.
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debt, as well as a higher relative price of nontradable goods, compared to the CE and
SP allocations. In the absence of the borrowing constraint, agents can borrow freely from
international capital markets to smooth consumption for any given stock of existing debt.
In contrast, the CE and SP allocations are relatively close: they diverge only slightly in
the region in which the constraint is not binding, but it is expected to bind in the future;
otherwise they coincide exactly, including particularly in the region in which the constraint
binds.
In the CE and the SP allocations, in the region in which the constraint binds (i.e., when
there is a financial crisis in our model), both consumption of tradables and the relative price
of nontradables fall sharply.14 This decline is the consequence of the so-called ”Fisherian
deflation” or fire sale mechanism emphasized in the financial crisis literature. When borrow-
ing is constrained, consumption is lower relative to the desired amount in the unconstrained
equilibrium. Lower tradable consumption is accompanied by a decline in relative price of
nontradables, which in turn reduces the value of collateral, tightening borrowing capacity
and reducing tradable consumption further, a feedback loop that results in an even lower
relative price of nontradables and tradable consumption.
As emphasized by Lorenzoni (2008), Korinek (2010) and Bianchi (2011), when the con-
straint does not bind (i.e. in normal times), but it is expected to bind in the future with
some positive probability, agents in the competitive equilibrium consume more than in the
social planner allocation. As the appendix shows, this difference arises because individual
agents don’t take into account the additional benefit of reducing consumption today, which
in turn represents the marginal benefit of consuming more when the constraint binds in the
future.
Note however that, in this endowment economy, for a given state
{
Bt, Y
N
t , Y
T
t
}
in which
the constraint binds, the CE and the SP allocations coincide. For a given amount of existing
14In the figure, the binding region starts in correspondence to the kink in the policy functions.
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debt, tradable consumption will be the same in the two allocations since it is constrained by
the borrowing limit. The equilibrium relative price of nontradables is also equalized, since
the consumption of nontradables is pinned down by its endowment.15
2.3 Alternative policy instruments
While there is a well defined scope for government intervention, in this economy, there is a
variety of instruments or tools with which policy could be conducted. In fact, there are at
least three types of taxes that can be used: a tax/subsidy on debt, a tax/subsidy on tradable
consumption and a tax/subsidy on nontradable consumption. Our policy analysis considers
all of them, studying their relative effectiveness in welfare terms if used one at the time as
well as their joint use.16
The policy analysis is conducted as a Ramsey optimal taxation exercise, assuming that
the government budget is always balanced. Thus, for given policy instrument(s), the Ramsey
planner maximizes the representative household’s utility function, subject to the resources
constraints and the first order conditions of its maximization problem.
Tax on debt The first policy tool that we examine is a tax τBt (< 0) or a subsidy (> 0)
on one-period debt issued at time t, Bt+1. This instrument is usually referred to as a capital
control.17 With lump-sum transfers/taxation, the government budget constraint is:
Tt = τ
B
t Bt+1, (9)
15Recall that the relative price of nontradables is proportional to the ratio of tradable over nontradable
consumption.
16Note that any given allocation could possibly be implemented by different tax instruments. This in-
determinacy in the tax instruments depends on the fact that there are two decisions margins but we are
considering three possible policy tools—see also Costinot et al. (2014) on this.
17One of the best known cases of a use of such a tool is the Brazilian IOF tax. See Pereira and Harris
(2012) for a detailed account of this actively researched country case.
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where Tt denotes the lump sum transfer or tax. In this case, the household’s budget constraint
in the competitive equilibrium of the model becomes
CTt + P
N
t C
N
t = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + Tt −Bt+1(1 + τBt ) + (1 + r)Bt, (10)
while the liquidity constraint becomes
φ
(
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
) ≥ CTt + PNt CNt − (1 + r)Bt + Tt. (11)
Combining these three constraints, gives rise to the same international borrowing constraint
as before, so that access to international financial market continues to be constrained by (4).
Taxes on consumption The other two policy tools are consumption taxes on non-tradable
and on tradable goods. Both policy tools influence directly equation (6) and affect the
relative price of nontradable goods, PNt , which in the context of our economy is a proxy for
the real exchange rate—see for example Mendoza (2002), Caballero and Lorenzoni (2014),
Korinek (2010), Bianchi (2011), Jeanne (2012), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2015) for
the same interpretation. For this reason, in what follows, these two tools are referred to as
“real exchange rate policy” or ”exchange rate policy” for brevity. Alternatively these taxes
can be also interpreted as fiscal devaluation/revaluation when monetary policy tools are not
available (i.e. in a fixed exchange rate regime or in a currency union).
With a tax on nontradable consumption, (1 + τNt ), the household’s budget constraint
becomes
CTt + P
N
t (1 + τ
N
t )C
N
t = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + Tt −Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt, (12)
where τNt > (<) 0 is now a tax (or a subsidy) on nontradable consumption and Tt > (<) 0 is
a government lump-sum transfer (or tax). As in the case of capital controls, the government
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budget balances period by period:
Tt = τ
N
t P
N
t C
N
t . (13)
In this case, the liquidity constraint becomes
φ
(
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
) ≥ CTt + (1 + τNt )PNt CNt − (1 + r)Bt + Tt, (14)
which combined with the individual and the government budget constraints above determines
the same international borrowing constraint as before (4).
With a tax on tradable consumption, (1 + τTt ), the household now faces the following
budget constraint:
(1 + τTt )C
T
t + P
T
t C
N
t = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + Tt −Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt. (15)
The government budget constraint continues to balance period by period:
Tt = τ
T
t C
T
t , (16)
and the borrowing constraint remains as in (4).
3 Optimal capital controls
This section studies the optimal Ramsey problem when the policy tool is τBt . The Ramsey
problem for τBt is to choose a competitive equilibrium that maximizes (1). More formally:
Definition 1 For a given {B0} and assuming that {Y Tt } and {Y Nt } are Markov processes
with finite, strictly positive support, the Ramsey problem for τBt is to choose a competitive
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equilibrium that maximizes
U j ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
{
βtu (Ct)
}
,
subject to the resource constraints (7) and (8), the government budget constraint (9), the
borrowing constraint
Bt+1 > −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
]
, (17)
and the first order conditions of the household,
u′(Ct)CCT (1 + τ
B) = λt + β (1 + r)Et [u
′(Ct+1)CCT ] , (18)
(1− ω) 1κ (CNt )− 1κ
ω
1
κ (CTt )
− 1
κ
= PNt . (19)
The following proposition that qualifies the main result of Bianchi (2011) can now be
stated:
Proposition 1 In an economy defined by (1), (4), (12) and (9) with a tax on τBt as
the government instrument, the Ramsey optimal policy with τB as instrument replicates the
social planner allocation (SP). Moreover the optimal policy is time-consistent.
PROOF: see online appendix.
A few remarks are in order here. As discussed by Bianchi (2011) and noted in the previous
section, when the constraint binds (i.e. λSPt > 0), the social planner allocation coincides with
the competitive equilibrium allocation, and therefore it is optimal to set τBt = 0. When the
constraint does not bind, but can bind with positive probability in the next period (i.e.
λSPt = 0, but Et[λ
SP
t+1Σ
SP
t+1] > 0 in equation (44) in the online appendix), the optimal state
contingent τBt is a tax on borrowing (τ
B
t < 0). Thus, it is optimal to engage in a policy
intervention even when the constraint does not bind but might bind in the future. In this
sense the optimal policy is “prudential” or “precautionary” in nature. Intuitively, since τBt
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is impotent during the crisis, the best thing that policy can do, conditional on having only
the tax on debt as instrument, is to reduce the probability that a crisis occurs by limiting
the amount that agents borrow in equilibrium (i.e. by taxing Bt+1). Note also that, in the
region in which the constraint binds (λt > 0), any value of τ
B
t can implement the social
planner allocation.18
Figure 2 plots the policy function of τBt , for a negative one-standard deviation shock,
that solves the optimal policy problem above and replicates the SP allocation, as well as the
welfare gains for τBt as a function of current bond holdings. Figure 3 reports the ergodic
distributions of debt in the CE and the SP allocations. Table 1 reports the ergodic mean
of debt as a share of (annual) income in units of tradable consumption, the unconditional
probability of a financial crisis in the model, as well as the average welfare gain associated
with this policy instrument relative to the CE.19
When the economy approaches the binding region, the tax rate goes to zero; before the
crisis hits, the higher is the probability that the constraint binds, the higher is the tax on
borrowing. Looking at the welfare gains it is evident that they also peak when the constraint
binds, but revert to zero slower than the tax rate. The welfare gains of optimal capital
controls persist past the level of debt at which the constraint binds because entering a crisis
with less debt makes the crisis relatively less costly (see Figure 8 below and its discussion
on this latter point). As Figure 3 and Table 1 illustrate, the policy intervention reduces the
debt/income ratio and the likelihood of a financial crisis. This implies that the economy, on
average, will borrow less under the optimal capital control policy than in the competitive
equilibrium, but will experience fewer and less severe financial crises (Table 1 and Figure 8).
18This is true as long as τB is less than τ¯B , i.e. the maximum value of the tax rate consistent with the
constraint being binding.
19See the appendix on the the solution method for the SP allocation and the computation of the welfare
gains.
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4 Optimal exchange rate policy
Let us now focus on use of consumption taxes financed with lump-sum taxation discussed
above. Specifically, consider first the nontradable consumption tax, as the online appendix
shows that the tax on tradable consumption can achieve the same results when used op-
timally. We refer to this policy tool as ”costless exchange rate policy” because it can be
implemented without incurring in any efficiency cost associated with its financing. Section
5 discusses the case of distortionary financing.
4.1 Nontradable tax
Like before, define first the Ramsey problem when τNt is the policy instrument.
Definition 2 For a given {B0} and assuming that {Y Tt } and {Y Nt } are Markov processes
with finite, strictly positive support, the Ramsey problem for τNt as instrument is to choose
a competitive equilibrium that maximizes
U j ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
{
βtu (Cj)
}
,
subject to the resource constraints (7) and (8), the government budget constraint (13), the
borrowing constraint
Bt+1 > −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
]
. (20)
and the first order conditions of the household
u′(Ct)CCT = λt + β (1 + r)Et [u
′(Ct+1)CCT ] , (21)
(1− ω) 1κ (CNt )− 1κ
ω
1
κ (CTt )
− 1
κ
= PNt (1 + τ
N
t ). (22)
It is important to point out that the non-tradable consumption tax directly affects the
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relative price of nontradables (i.e. the real exchange rate). Note also that, in normal times
and in the unconstrained equilibrium, the determination of the consumption of tradable and
non-tradable goods is independent from PNt . Therefore, τ
N
t is neutral when the constraint
does not bind. In fact, the Euler equation and the goods market equilibrium conditions
are all that is needed to determine consumption of tradables and nontradables when the
constraint does not bind. In contrast, when the constraint binds, τNt is no longer neutral
because changes in PNt affect the value of the collateral, and hence the consumption of
tradable goods.
The next proposition says that, when used optimally, this policy instrument can achieve
the unconstrained allocation (i.e., it assures that the borrowing constraint is never strictly
binding in the equilibrium of our economy so that λt = 0 for all t). To characterize the solu-
tion of this Ramsey problem, one can follow the same two steps of the previous proposition.
Thus, first characterize a policy rule for τNt that decentralizes the unconstrained competitive
equilibrium. Then show that this equilibrium is the one that solves the Ramsey problem
above.
Proposition 2 In an economy defined by (1), (4), (12) and (13) with a tax on non-tradable
consumption τNt as the government instrument, there exists a policy for τ
N
t that decentralizes
the unconstrained allocation. This policy is Ramsey optimal and time-consistent.
PROOF: see online appendix.
Several remarks are also in order here. The proposition above implies that exchange
rate policy always dominates capital control policy in welfare terms. Under this policy, it is
possible to undo the constraint completely and replicate the unconstrained equilibrium. In
contrast, capital controls can only limit (by reducing the probability of hitting the constraint)
the distortionary effects of the pecuniary externality associated with the constraint, but
not the constraint itself. As we can see from Table 1, these welfare differences can be
quantitatively very large.
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How does exchange rate policy work? The intuition for the result is that (22) directly
links the tax rate to the relative price of nontradables. When the borrowing constraint does
not bind, the policy tool is neutral in the sense that it affects PNt , but not the consumption
allocation. In contrast, when the constraint binds, the tax is no longer neutral and can be
used to affect the value of collateral in the borrowing constraint, and hence also tradable
consumption. By subsidizing the consumption of nontradable goods, the policy increases
its relative price. Crucially, when the constraint binds, a higher relative price increases the
value of collateral and avoids the debt-deflation mechanism that would otherwise ensue.20
In equilibrium, agents anticipate that this policy will undo the constraint when it binds
and will behave as if the constraint does not exist (i.e. like in the unconstrained allocation).
As we can see from Figure 1, for a given endowment of nontradable goods, the uncon-
strained allocation (UE) entails a much higher price of nontradables and consumption of
tradable goods during tranquil times than in the two constrained allocations (the CE and
SP). Eventually (i.e. in finite time) our economy will hit the borrowing constraint because
agents are relatively impatient. When that happens, under the optimal policy, τN will be
set so that the multiplier on the constraint is zero (i.e. the constraint is just binding).
Notice here that the policy function for τN is time-consistent, and hence promising to
eliminate the borrowing constraint by supporting the relative price of nontradable whenever
the constraint binds is fully credible in equilibrium.
This optimal policy can also be implemented with a fixed tax rate. Since any policy
schedule τNt ∈ (−1, τˆNt ] can achieve the unconstrained allocation, for any τˆNt that undoes
the borrowing constraint, there also exists a fixed subsidy τNfix ∈ (−1, τˆNt ] that replicates such
allocation. This consideration is important because it simplifies the practical implementation
of the policy. Indeed, for a given exogenous state {Y Tt , Y Nt } with finite support, it is possible
20For this reason, in broader terms, we can interpret this policy also as a collateral price support policy,
aimed at putting a floor under asset price valuations during a financial crisis. In the specific case of our
model, it takes the form of a fiscal intervention aimed at supporting the relative price of non tradeable that
enters the borrowing constraint.
24
to determine the corresponding fixed subsidy for which the constraint does not bind. The
fixed level of τNfix will be such that τ
N
fix ∈ (−1, τˆNt,min], where τˆNt,min is the lowest value of the
subsidy given the finite support of the exogenous states.
Welfare gains from this policy tool are two orders of magnitude higher than the gains
from implementing the SP allocations in Table 1. Figure 4 plots the implied optimal τN as a
function of current debt position and the associated welfare gains for a negative one-standard
deviation shock. The implied subsidy and the welfare gains associated with it increase
with the level of debt. As Figure 4 illustrates, this optimal policy subsidizes nontradable
consumption, limiting the downward pressure on the relative price of non tradable goods.
As a result, agents can borrow and consume much more in both good and bad times. In
this case, however, the probability of a crisis is zero, despite the fact that borrowing and
consumption are much higher than in the CE or the SP (Table 1).
Note here that, for our calibration (which is the same as in Bianchi, 2011), agents are
very impatient and the incentive to borrow dominates the precautionary motive that tends
to contain their borrowing. The relative strength of this “impatience” effect implies that
even when the initial net foreign assets position is positive, agents will borrow up to the
borrowing limit, so that a tax subsidy on nontradable consumption is needed to relax the
credit constraint. As the current debt position worsens, the state contingent tax subsidy
becomes bigger, tending towards the lower bound of -1.
To quantify what a more realistic policy can achieve in welfare terms, consider the case
of a fix, 10 percent nontradable subsidy. Such intervention yields an average relative price of
on nontradables that is approximately 10 percent less depreciated than in the competitive
equilibrium, with an average welfare gain of 0.4 percent of permanent consumption. This is
about the same as the gain attained with the optimal capital control policy, which nonetheless
is a state contingent tax schedule (Table 1).
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4.2 Tradable tax
This section highlights the differences between the working of the tax on nontradable and the
one on tradable consumption, as the appendix shows that they achieve the same allocation
and welfare gains.
The tax on tradable consumption τTt affects not only the intratemporal relative price,
but also the intertemporal allocation of resources through the Euler equation. Despite this
difference, it is possible to find a policy for τTt that replicates the unconstrained allocation,
like in the case of the nontradable consumption tax τNt . The difference between the two
policies is that the subsidy on nontradable consumption requires financing through lump sum
taxes, while the revenues from the tax on tradables will be rebated as lump sum transfers
to private agents. From a practical standpoint, this is important though, as fiscal space is
typically limited in the midst of a financial crisis.
Indeed, both policy tools (τTt and τ
N
t ) could be interpreted more strictly in terms of fiscal
policy actions or more broadly as policy aimed at targeting the real exchange rate. In a way,
the latter interpretation is related to the recent literature that proposes to manipulate the
real exchange rate through the use of fiscal tools—see for instance Lipinska and Von Tadden
(2009), Franco (2011) and Fahri, Gopinath and Itskhoki (2013). The difference is that here
we want to limit the depreciation of the real exchange rate for financial stability purposes,
while in the literature on fiscal devaluation the idea is to engineer a devaluation to gain
competitiveness.
5 Optimal capital controls and exchange rate policy
with distortionary financing
The previous section showed that exchange rate policy dominates capital control policy in
welfare terms when it can be implemented in a costless manner—i.e., by using lump-sum
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transfers to finance the nontradable subsidy, and hence without introducing any additional
distortion. The key point is that, in a debt-deflation environment, optimal policy aims
at relaxing the collateral constraint. In particular, optimal policy aim at supporting the
relative price that influences the borrowing constraint and, in principle, can undo the effects
of a binding constraint completely. The result however hinges on the ability of the Ramsey
planner to manipulate the price of collateral without costs, because our instruments operate
in the context of a balanced budget in which lump sum transfers or taxes are available.
This section departs from this key assumption and considers an environment in which
lump-sum transfers/taxes are not available, the government budget balances with distor-
tionary financing, and it is costly to manipulate the price of the collateral with consumption
taxes. As Section 6 below discusses further, the distortionary financing cost introduced can
be interpreted more broadly as representing another friction in the economy, a second ob-
jective of exchange rate policy, or any situation in which managing the real exchange rate
during a financial crisis is difficult. For this reason we label these set of interventions ”costly
exchange rate policy”.
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Given the structure of our endowment economy, there are two possibilities for the gov-
ernment budget constraint. In the first one, the set of taxes is arbitrarily restricted to τBt
and τNt . In the second one, all all the tax instruments discussed thus far, τ
B
t , τ
N
t , and τ
T
t can
be used. So let’s look at each of them in turn.
21In a model with heterogenous agents, lump-sum instruments will have distributional implications. Here
we abstract from these issues, but still consider an environment in which lump sum instruments are not
available.
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5.1 Two policy instruments
In the first case, the government budget constraint becomes:
τBt Bt+1 = τ
N
t P
N
t C
N
t , (23)
with the tax on borrowing financing the subsidy on nontradable goods or, alternatively,
the subsidy rebating the revenue from taxing debt. The following definition states the
corresponding Ramsey problem.
Definition 3 For a given {B0} and assuming that {Y Tt } and {Y Nt } are Markov processes
with finite, strictly positive support, the Ramsey problem for τNt and τ
B
t when (23) holds is
to choose a competitive equilibrium that maximizes
U j ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
{
βtu
(
Cjt
)}
,
subject to (7) and (8) and (20), and the first order conditions of the households
u′(Ct)CCT (1 + τ
B
t ) = λt + β (1 + r)Et [u
′(Ct+1)CCT ] , (24)
(1− ω) 1κ (CNt )− 1κ
ω
1
κ (CTt )
− 1
κ
= PNt (1 + τ
N
t ). (25)
There is no analytical solution for this problem, so one has to relay on numerical methods.
To do so, note first that, given our chosen instruments (i.e. τNt and τ
B
t ), the problem is
time consistent.22 Next, We use the computational algorithm that exploits the Markov-
Perfect nature of the equilibrium, proposed by Benigno et al. (2012) and summarized in
22To see this, note that the problem above can be reduced to a static one by considering the restricted case
in which the Ramsey planner maximizes agents’ utility subject to (7), (8), (20) and (25). One can then solve
for the allocations, the multiplier on the credit constraint and the relative price. Next, use (23) and (24) to
retrieve the path of taxes. The online appendix also provides an alternative proof based on the equivalence
between the commitment and the time-consistent solution of the problem above.
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the appendix. Note that, for comparison purposes, the economy continues to be calibrated
exactly as in Bianchi (2011). The rest of this section reports and discusses only the actual
solution.
Figure 5 plots the policy function under the optimal policy for τNt and τ
B
t and the associ-
ated welfare gains in terms of tradeable consumption as a function of current bond holdings
for a negative one-standard deviation shock. Figures 6 describes the policy function for
Bt+1, C
T
t and P
N
t under the optimal policy (OP, dashed line) and the competitive allocation
(CE, solid line). Figure 7 reports the ergodic distribution of debt. In order to assess the
severity of the crisis, Figure 8 also reports the ergodic distribution of total consumption
growth in unit of tradable consumption during crisis times (i.e., the change in consumption
from t− 1 to t, given that the economy is in a financial crisis in period t). For this purpose,
a crisis is identified, as in Bianchi (2011), by a constraint that binds strictly and a debt
reduction larger than one-standard deviation. In these plots, the constraint binds at a level
of debt of about -0.95, where the policy rules display a kink.
As Figure 5 shows, when exchange rate policy is costly, there is scope for both ex-post and
ex-ante interventions. During crises times, like before, the optimal policy requires subsidies
to non-tradable consumption to limit the depreciation of the relative price of nontradable
goods. This is now financed by a tax on the amount that agents borrow. During normal
times, the optimal policy requires capital controls whose revenues are rebated in the form of
subsidies to nontradable consumption.
The optimal policy mix depends crucially on the interaction between ex-ante and ex-post
interventions. In the context of our simple economy, this interaction is affected by the way
the policy interventions are financed. When financing of ex-post intervention is not costly
(i.e. there are lump-sum taxes) policies aimed at supporting the market price of collateral
are fully effective and can achieve the unconstrained allocation. In contrast, when financing
of ex-post intervention is distortive, preventing excessive depreciation of the real exchange
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rate becomes costly, and the optimal policy weights the marginal benefit of relaxing the
borrowing constraint with the distortion introduced by capital controls. Indeed, when the
constraint binds, the tax on debt affects Ct+1 through (24). Since the ex-post policy becomes
costly, it is no longer fully effective in addressing the pecuniary externality, and it becomes
optimal to intervene during normal times to reduce the probability of meeting the borrowing
constraint. Consistent with this, a comparison of Figure 2 and Figure 5 shows that the
optimal tax rate on debt, in the region where the constraint is not binding, is now much
smaller than the case in which capital control is the only government instrument.
There are three other features of the optimal policy that are noteworthy. First, when
the constraint is not binding, while the tax on the amount that agents borrow affects their
borrowing decision, the subsidy to nontradable consumption is neutral and is equivalent to
a lump-sum transfer. On the other hand when the constraint binds, both instruments affect
the real allocation.
Second, in this more general set up, like in the case of costless exchange rate policy, there
continues to be more borrowing and consumption than in the competitive equilibrium despite
the fact that the economy experiences fewer and less severe crises (see Table 1 and Figure 8).
The Ramsey planner achieves this by choosing a different allocation of consumption, with
relatively more consumption of tradable goods compared to the competitive equilibrium
allocation. As a consequence, the welfare gains of this optimal policy mix are more than
twice as large as those in which only capital controls are used, and continue to be larger
the more indebted is the economy (see Figure 5 and Table 1). This is consistent with the
old adage that where borrowing is allocated is at least as important as how much borrowing
takes place.
Third and finally, agents borrow more than in the competitive equilibrium allocation
during normal times even though optimal policy requires a tax on the amount agents borrow
(Figure 6 and 7). Intuitively, on the one hand, agents want to borrow less because their
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borrowing is taxed; on the other hand, they are willing to borrow more since crises events
are mitigated (only in part in this case) by policy intervention (see Figure 8 and Table 1,
respectively). Indeed, the real exchange rate depreciates less during crises times compared to
the competitive equilibrium allocation and allows agents to consume more (Figure 6). In this
setting, therefore, the rationale for capital controls is not related to the amount that agents
borrow in the unregulated economy, the so called ”overborrowing” on which the existing
literature focused on, but rather to the relative (in)effectiveness of the ex post intervention.
5.2 Three policy instruments
Consider now the second possibility in which all available distortionary taxes can be combined
to balance the budget:
τBt Bt+1 = τ
N
t P
N
t C
N
t + τ
T
t C
T
t . (26)
In this situation, it is possible to show analytically that there is a combination of the three
tools that can achieve the unconstrained allocation even if there are no lump-sum trans-
fers/taxes. In the appendix, we prove that we can always combine the triplet of policy tools
(τNt , τ
T
t ,τ
B
t ) to undo the international borrowing constraint.
The policy implication of this last exercise echoes what was emphasized earlier: the set of
instruments and their relative effectiveness is crucial for the optimal policy design. The third
instrument addresses the distortion introduced by the second one in crisis times. Intuitively,
it is possible to use the tax on tradable goods to undo the efficiency losses caused by the
use of tax on borrowing when policy aims at supporting the real exchange rate. This is
consistent with the notion that with enough instruments we can always undo a friction—cfr.
Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2008). In our specific context, this implies that the challenge
for the policy maker is to identify the particualr combination of instruments that are most
effective in addressing the pecuniary externality and its interaction with the others relevant
frictions in the economy.
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5.3 Extensions
Our analysis shows that, in economies with occasionally binding collateral constraints, it is
optimal to design policies aimed at relaxing the constraint when it binds, and the desirability
of policies aimed at preventing crisis depends on the cost-effectiveness of such crisis resolution
interventions. Here we want to discuss some extensions of the basic framework and show
that the main messages of our optimal policy analysis are robust in this model environment.
Imperfect exchange rate intervention Consider first a more realistic case of costly
(or less than fully effective) ex-post intervention, which we label ”imperfect exchange rate
intervention,” for example, because it is not be feasible to perfectly control the real exchange
rate during the financial crisis. In practice, this might be due to imperfect credibility or
because of limited availability of foreign exchange reserves needed to support the nominal
exchange rate, as we discuss in section 6 below.
To model this idea (fully developed in the appendix), assume that when it is not feasible
to implement the desired level of the subsidy τN , τN must be set to zero. The appendix
shows that under this policy it is not always possible to relax the collateral constraint, so
that it becomes optimal to intervene ex-ante, from a Ramsey planner perspective, like in the
case of distortionary financing discussed above. Intuitively, when exchange rate intervention
is imperfect, crises become more costly events, and it is desirable to tax borrowing in normal
times to limit the probability that a crisis occurs.
Borrowing constraint with post-tax income A second extension is a situation in which
the borrowing constraint depends on post-tax income as follows:
Bt+1 > −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t − Tt
]
. (27)
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The appendix shows that, under this assumption, changes in τN financed through Tt, will
not relax the borrowing constraint23. Despite this, it is possible to show that the general
principle of optimal policy design in this class of models that we stressed above continues to
hold, but may require the use of different policy tools. In fact, in this specific case, the policy
maker would need to use the tax on borrowing, τB, along with lump-sum transfers/taxes to
relax the constraint. When (27) holds and binds, the Ramsey planner can increase the value
of the collateral by transferring resources to the household via Tt, at the a cost of higher τ
B.
Indeed, the appendix shows that this case is isomorphic to the one in which the borrowing
constraint depends on pre-tax income, and the available policy tools are τN and τB. The
only difference is that the borrowing constraint is now relaxed through Tt rather than by
engineering an increase PNt .
Production Lastly, note that in a production economy there would be multiple margins on
which the pecuniary externality can distort decisions—see for instance the economy analyzed
by Benigno et al. (2012 and 2013). In this case, Benigno et al. (2012) show that exchange
rate policy alone via τN cannot remove the borrowing constraint or even achieve the SP
allocation of that economy. For example, the optimal policy for τN alone, in that more
general setting, is a tax in normal times and a subsidy in crisis times. The policy, therefore,
has both a crisis prevention element aimed at containing the frequency of financial crises, and
a crisis resolution element aimed at mitigating their effect by relaxing the constraint when
they do occur. To achieve the SP allocation of that economy or to remove the borrowing
constraint altogether, however, would require the use of multiple tools. Indeed, in that
model environment, collateral price support policies induce distortions in the allocation of
labor between tradeable and non-tradeable production that requires the use of an offsetting
policy tool to fully restore efficiency or contain the cost of trying to remove the constraint.
23This can be seen by combining (27) with the government budget constraint Tt = τ
N
t P
N
t C
N
t .
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6 Discussion
Our model is useful to discuss exchange rate policy in the real world, and the implied
”optimal” policies are consistent with the experience of emerging market economies over the
past 20 years or so.
A first implication of our analysis is on the role of collateral price support policies when
they can be implemented in a costless manner. In the context of the model, these policies
take the form of a fiscal subsidy to the consumption of nontradable goods, financed in a lump
sum manner. This contains the fall of the relative price of nontradable (or the depreciation
of the real exchange rate in our model) that typically occurs during a sudden stop of capital
inflows. If such a policy is feasible, our analysis shows that, not only it contains the crisis
when one occurs, but it also eliminates the scope for any prudential measure such as capital
controls. This is because the intervention can removes the borrowing constraint altogether,
which is the only source of inefficiency in our model economy. Of course, in reality, there are
other distortions, possibly leading to different conclusions as it is discussed below.
Which polices in the real world can support the real exchange rate and how costly are
they to implement? In practice, the real exchange rate is typically supported by defending
the nominal exchange rate by selling previously accumulated foreign exchange reserves. And
while accumulating or borrowing foreign exchange reserves is costly, drawing them down at
any particular point in time is costless.
For example, during the global financial crisis, Brazil and Mexico faced a sudden stop in
private capital inflows following the Lehmann’s collapse in September 2008. The Brazilian
Real depreciated by more than 20 percent in a month against the US dollar, and the central
bank intervened heavily to defend it as predicted by our model. As Mesquita and Toros
(2010) emphasize, the main motivation for this intervention was the vulnerability of the
non-financial corporate sector to the depreciation of the Real because of their exposure in
the derivative market to US dollar swaps (proxyed in our model with borrowing in units of
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tradable consumption). A similar experience was shared by Mexico when large corporate
entities were also exposed to foreign currency derivatives at the time of Lehmann’s collapse.
In their account of the Mexican experience, Chang, Cespedes and Velasco (2012) emphasize
how the response of the policy authorities consisted in foreign exchange market intervention
with the objective to limit the depreciation of the Mexican Peso in the face of currency
mismatches in the corporate sector balance sheet.
More broadly, in the context of the recent US and European financial crises, the prescrip-
tion of our model can be interpreted as interventions that avoid the collapse of asset prices
when a crisis occurs. In this sense, our results not only rationalizes the need to set a floor
under the exchange rate as in the emerging market crises of the 1990s and the 2000s, but
also the non-conventional policies of purchasing risky assets to contain ”fire sales” and the
asset deflation spirals that characterized the United States and European crises.24
Official reserves however are always limited, and this limited availability exposes countries
to costly speculative attacks. Many emerging market countries learned this lesson the hard
way in the 1990s and the 2000s as speculative attacks on limited pools of foreign exchange
reserves broke many pegs: Mexico in 1994, Thailand in 1997, South Korea and Indonesia
in 1998, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Argentina in 2001, Uruguay in 2002, etc. Once
out of reserves, these countries had to borrow foreign currency from the IMF under tight
macroeconomic adjustment programs to contain the initial devaluations. Indeed, as predicted
by our model, supporting the exchange rate was a crucial component of all adjustment
programs supported by the IMF in Indonesia, South Korea, and Brazil during the period
1997-1999 (IMF Independent Evaluation Office, 2003). These adjustment programs turned
out to be economically and politically very costly. As a result, after these crises, countries
started to accumulate very large pools of official reserves to deploy in support of the exchange
24It is possible to show that the small open economy studied here is isomorphic to an environment in which
domestic banks intermediate foreign saving and households borrow using a domestic asset as collateral. In
that context, optimal ex post policy, when warranted, supports domestic asset prices. See Bianchi (2011)
and Cesa-Bianchi and Rebucci (2016) for more discussion of that set up.
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rate in the case of sudden halt in capital inflows as they did during the global financial
crisis.25 But even when accomplished gradually rather than borrowing from the IMF, reserve
accumulation is costly. Countries must save in a precautionary manner in a riskless asset
while continuing to borrow in risky instruments as long as they are in a net debtor position.
So there is a carry cost, or premium for holding reserves.
Perhaps even more importantly, exchange rate policy also has other objectives than that
of maintaining financial stability by mitigating the effects of currency mismatches. Exchange
rate policy is typically tasked to also address competitiveness issues and to contribute to
macroeconomic stability by helping to manage inflation. In our model, financial stability is
the only policy objective, as there are no other frictions justifying intervening in the economy
for macroeconomic stabilization or competitiveness reasons.
If we were to introduce other frictions and hence policy objectives, a trade off would
emerge similar to the one we studied in the previous section by assuming distortionary
financing of exchange rate policy or imperfect exchange rate interventions. One example
is a government that targets the real exchange rate by manipulating the nominal parity in
the presence of both a borrowing constraint like ours and a nominal rigidity. In this case,
the advantage of keeping the exchange rate relatively appreciated is to support the agents’
borrowing capacity. The disadvantage of would be to cause unemployment in response to
shocks. Our distortionary cost captures the essence of costly ex post interventions in the
presence of other distortions or government objectives.26
Indeed, the second main policy implication of our analysis is that, if financial crises
cannot be contained or mitigated without incurring significant costs, or there are additional
25Emerging markets official reserves (excluding gold) increased from about one trillion US dollar in 2000
to over 6 trillions in 2012 according to IMF IFS data (or about a third of world GDP valued at current US
dollars). While this spectacular accumulation of reserve assets cannot be explained entirely by prudential
or precautionary motives, most empirical studies concur that precautionary saving is the most important
determinant of this process.
26Ottonello (2015) studies optimal exchange rate policy in such a set up and illustrates the trade off
between increasing agents’ borrowing capacity (dubbed credit access policy) and unemployment.
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distortions to consider associated with their resolution, a policy of crisis prevention becomes
part of the optimal policy mix, such as for instance using capital controls in a countercyclical
manner. However, when both ex ante and ex post interventions are used jointly under the
optimal policy mix, the level of the tax on borrowing is much lower than when the capital
control is used as the only instrument (cfr. Figure 2 and 5).
This latter result is consistent with available empirical evidence on the use of capital
controls. As Fernandez, Rebucci, and Uribe (2015) pointed out, if countries were to use
capital controls in a prudential manner as implied by Proposition 1, we should observe
active use of countercyclical capital controls. However, when Fernandez et al (2015) looked
at a large number of countries over the period 1995-2011, they found that capital controls
are virtually flat during episodes of boom and bust in output or the current account.
In summary, we conclude from this review of country experiences over the past 20 years
or so that, while the mechanics of optimal policies implied by our model are different than
those typically implemented in the around the world, the general principle followed by these
policies is very much consistent with them. The policies implied by our analysis are also
consistent with the available empirical evidence on the use of capital controls, in stark
contrast to those implied by the existing literature.
7 Conclusion
In response to the recent global financial crisis, a new policy paradigm emerged in which old
fashioned forms of government interventions such as capital controls and other quantitative
restrictions on credit flows—the so called macro-prudential policies—have become part of
the standard policy toolkit. Arguably, macro-prudential policies are desirable because they
can help prevent financial crises that otherwise would be too costly to endure or contain
with only ex post interventions.
In this paper we study the optimal policy mix of ex post, crisis management policy tools
37
and ex ante, crisis prevention policy tools. We first show that when the Ramsey planner
can choose among different policy tools, ex post collateral price support policies dominate
prudential policy measures in welfare terms by a very large margin. This dominance is
conditional on the extent to which price support policies do not entail efficiency losses.
Indeed, when collateral price support policies can be used without costs, there is no need
for macro prudential policies. In contrast, when crisis management policies are not fully
effective because they are costly to implement, ex-ante policies such as capital controls can
be rationalized as a complement to collateral price support policies that limit the occurrence
of crises. The joint use of ex ante and ex post policies achieves a welfare gain of more than 1
percent of permanent consumption in our model; a gain that is twice as large as the welfare
gain of using only capital controls.
Our analysis is conducted in the context of a relatively simple quantitative model, but in
reality the trade-offs that policymakers face are richer that the ones implied by our frame-
work. For instance, there are benefits from a more depreciated exchange rate in terms of the
classical expenditure switching effect of the exchange rate that are not incorporated into our
analysis. To an extent, our model can be interpreted as one in which balance-sheet consider-
ations dominate other exchange rate policy motives, but we acknowledge that a richer model
would be needed to quantify these issues. We regard the study of optimal monetary and
macro-prudential policy in a quantitative model in which pecuniary externalities interact
with nominal rigidities as an area of fruitful future research.
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A Appendix (for online publication)
A.1 Competitive equilibria
In the competitive equilibrium of the economy with the borrowing constraint and without
government intervention (which we also call the ”constrained allocation” for brevity), house-
holds maximize (1) subject to (3) and (4) by choosing CNt , C
T
t and Bt+1. The Lagrangian
for this problem is
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
 11−ρC1−ρt + λt
(
Bt+1 +
1−φ
φ
[
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
])
+
µt
(
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t −Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt − CTt − PNt CNt
)
,

with λt and µt denoting the multipliers on the borrowing constraint and the budget con-
straint, respectively. The first order conditions of this problem are:
CT : u
′(Ct)CCT = µt, (28)
CN : u
′(Ct)CCN = µtP
N
t , (29)
Bt+1 : µt = λt + β (1 + r)Et [µt+1] . (30)
λt
{
Bt+1 +
1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
]}
= 0 (31)
Combining (28) and (29) we have:
(1− ω) 1κ (CNt )− 1κ
ω
1
κ (CTt )
− 1
κ
= PNt . (32)
This constrained allocation can now be characterized completely by the first order conditions
(30), (31) and (32) and the goods market equilibrium conditions:
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CTt = Y
T
t −Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt, (33)
and
CNt = Y
N
t . (34)
A.1.1 Parameter values
The parameter values of the model are set exactly as in Bianchi (2011):
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Structural parameters Values
Elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods κ = .83
Intertemporal substitution and risk aversion ρ = 2
Credit constraint parameter φ = 0.75758 1/
Relative weight of tradable and non-tradable goods ω = 0.31
Discount factor β = 0.91
Exogenous variables Values
World real interest rate r = 0.04
Steady state endowments Y N = Y T = 1
Endowment process
Autocorrelation Matrix
 0.901 0.495
−0.453 0.225

Variance-Covariance Matrix
 0.00219 0.00162
0.00162 0.00167

Average values in the ergodic distribution Values
Net foreign assets B = −0.91
1/ This value of φ implies a value for κ = .32 in Bianchi’s (2011) notation.
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A.1.2 Ruling out multiple equilibria
The borrowing constraint can induce multiple equilibria due to the possibility of a self-
fulfilling decline in the relative price of nontradables that can reduce the value of the collat-
eral, and the consumption of tradable goods, in a manner compatible with the initial decline
in the relative price of nontradables. More formally, by combining the borrowing constraint
(4), the budget constraint (3) and the pricing equation we obtain:
CTt = Bt(1 + r) +
(
1 +
1− φ
φ
)Y Tt + (1− ω) 1κ (CNt )− 1κ
ω
1
κ (CTt )
− 1
κ
 ≡ f (CTt ) .
When the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is less than 1 (goods are complements),
a sufficient condition for unicity is that the derivative of the RHS of this expression with
respect to CT (f
′ (
CT
)
), evaluated at the intersection point with the LHS is greater than
1. Indeed, when Bt(1 + r) +
(
1 + 1−φ
φ
)
Y Tt < 0 and κ < 1, we have that lim
CT→0
f
′
(CT ) = 0
and lim
CT→∞
f
′
(CT ) = ∞. These conditions, which are satisfied in our calibration, combined
with the assumption that f
′ (
CT
)
> 1 evaluated at the intersection point, guarantee that
the equilibrium is unique—see also the discussion of Jeanne and Korinek (2012).
Another issue that might arise in our model, given our specification of the borrowing
constraint, is the possibility that, when the amount that the planner borrows increases, then
the relative price of nontradable rises the value of the collateral by more than the increase
in Bt+1, thus leading to a relaxation of the borrowing constraint. Our calibration also rules
out the possibility of such a perverse dynamic.
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A.1.3 Unconstrained allocation
In terms of equilibrium conditions, the allocation without the borrowing constraint, which
we call the ”unconstrained allocation”, is fully characterized by the following equations:
u′(CUEt )C
UE
CT = µ
UE
t , (35)
u′(CUEt )C
UE
CN = µ
UE
t
(
PNt
)UE
, (36)
µUEt = β (1 + r)Et
[
µUEt+1
]
, (37)
along with the goods market equilibrium conditions (7) and (8).27
A.1.4 First best allocation
With perfect access to complete asset markets, an allocation that we call the ”first best”,
households maximize utility subject to their budget constraint state-by-state and period-by-
period, expressed in units of tradable consumption.
Let’s assume agents can trade a set of state-contingent securities at time 0, which pay
one unit of tradables in a particular state at time t. Let zt describe the history of shocks at
time t, and let pi0(z
t) denotes the time-zero probability of a particular history, with Q0(z
t)
denoting the time-zero price of a security paying one unit of tradables at time t in history
zt. We denote with pit(zt+1|zt) the probability of being in state zt+1 in time t+ 1 conditional
on a given history at time t. Then the period budget constraint of an individual agent is:
∑
zt+1
Qt(zt+1|zt)Bjt+1 (zt+1) + CTt + PNt CNt = Y Tt
(
zt
)
+ PNt Y
N
t
(
zt
)
+Bjt .
Note here that state-contingent securities can only pay off in terms tradable goods.28 We
27Since we assume that there is a lower bound on debt strictly greater than the natural debt limit, B > Bn,
the ergodic distribution of external debt is strictly above the natural debt limit.
28This is a natural restriction, as agents in different countries can only promise to transfer tradable
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also continue to assume that in our economy there is a lower bound on debt that is strictly
greater than the natural debt limit, B > Bn. Since nontradable consumption is equal to
its endowment, which is positive in every state of nature, this lower bound guarantees that
tradable consumption has a strictly positive lower bound. Thus, the following constraint
needs to be satisfied:
Bt+1
(
zt+1
) ≥ B (zt+1)
or
CTt > 0.
Optimal behavior in this economy can be characterized in terms of the following first
order conditions:
CT : (Ct)
1
κ
−ρ ω
1
κ
(
CTt
)− 1
κ = µt
(
zt
)
, (38)
CN : (Ct)
1
κ
−ρ (1− ω) 1κ (CNt )− 1κ = µt (zt)PNt , (39)
Bt+1
(
zt+1
)
: Qt(zt+1|zt)µt
(
zt
)
= βpi(zt+1|zt)µt+1
(
zt+1
)
. (40)
Combining (38) and (39) we have:
(1− ω) 1κ (CNt )− 1κ
ω
1
κ (CTt )
− 1
κ
= PNt . (41)
We can then combine (38) and (39) with the definition of the price index to get:
Pt =
ω
(Ct) 1κ−ρ ω 1κ (CTt )− 1κ
µt (zt)
1−κ + (1− ω)
(Ct) 1κ−ρ (1− ω) 1κ (CNt )− 1κ
µt (zt)
1−κ
1
1−κ
.
goods to each other in different states because, by their nature, non-tradable goods cannot be transferred
internationally. In equilibrium non-tradable consumption must still equal non-tradable output in each state,
for each country.
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From this expression we obtain
(µtPt)
1−κ = (Ct)
(1−κ)(1−ρκ)
κ (Ct)
κ−1
κ ,
which becomes
µtPt = C
−ρ
t
and holds for every state of nature. Since the price of a state contingent asset is common
across countries and it is the same as the one that the small open economy faces, we have
that
Qt(zt+1|zt)µ∗t
(
zt
)
= βpi
(
zt+1|zt
)
µ∗t+1
(
zt+1
)
,
where µ∗ denote the rest of the world marginal utility of tradeable consumption. It is now
easy to obtain (
Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ
Pt
Pt+1
=
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−ρ
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
.
Iterating on this condition and defining δ0 ≡
(
C0
C∗0
)−ρ
P ∗0
P0
, we finally obtain the familiar,
complete market risk sharing condition
(
C∗t
Ct
)−ρ
= δ0
P ∗t
Pt
,
which links the ratio of the national price levels, or the real exchange rate, to the consumption
differential with the rest of the world.
Figure 1A plots the lifetime utility or the first best and unconstrained allocations and
shows that the two differs significantly only for high level of initial debt.
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A.2 Social planner allocation
A benevolent social planner maximizes (1) subject to the same borrowing constraint (4) that
private agents face and the market clearing conditions for tradables and nontradables goods
(7) and (8).
In specifying this problem, the equilibrium price of nontradables is determined compet-
itively according to the pricing rule (6) that serves also as a constraint to the planning
problem. By substituting the relative price of nontradables, PNt in the borrowing constraint
(4) with the competitive pricing rule (6) we can write the Lagrangian of the planning problem
as
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt

1
1−ρ (Ct)
1−ρ + µSP1,t
(
Y Tt −Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt − CTt
)
+
+µSP2,t
(
Y Nt − CNt
)
+ λSPt
(
Bt+1 +
1−φ
φ
[
Y Tt +
(
(1−ω)(CTt )
ωY Nt
) 1
κ
Y N
])
 ,
where µSP1,t , µ
SP
2,t and λ
SP
t denote the multipliers and the superscript SP distinguishes them
from those in the constrained and unconstrained allocations. The planner must choose the
optimal path for CTt , C
N
t and Bt+1, and the first order conditions for its problem are:
CT : u
′(CSPt )C
SP
CT + λ
SP
t Σ
SP
t = µ
SP
1,t , (42)
CN : u
′(CSPt )C
SP
CN = µ
SP
2,t , (43)
Bt+1 : µ
SP
1,t = λ
SP
t + β (1 + r)Et
[
µSP1,t+1
]
. (44)
λSPt
{
BSPt+1 +
1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
]}
= 0 (45)
where ΣSPt ≡ 1−φφ ∂P
N
t
∂CTt
Y Nt =
1−φ
φ
1
κ
(1−ω)
ω
(
(1−ω)(CTt )
ω
) 1
κ
−1 (
Y Nt
)κ−1
κ .
The key difference between the planning allocation and the competitive one (with the
borrowing constraint) follows from examining equations (42) and (28). The planner inter-
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nalizes the consequences of her/his decisions on PNt . When the constraint binds (λ
SP
t > 0),
there is an additional benefit in consuming an extra unit tradable consumption, represented
by the term λSPt Σt. This term captures the increase in the price of non-tradable goods asso-
ciated with the marginal increase in tradable consumption. As we we discuss in the paper,
this difference between the two margins has intertemporal implications and affects agents
behavior also when the constraint does not bind.
A.3 Optimal policy with a tax on debt
Proof of Proposition 1 In an economy defined by (1), (4), (12) and (9) with a tax on τBt
as the government instrument, the Ramsey optimal policy with τB as instrument replicates
the social planner allocation (SP). Moreover the optimal policy is time-consistent.
PROOF: Let’s consider first a less restricted version of the Ramsey problem in which the
planner maximizes (1) subject to (7) and (8), (17) and (19). This problem corresponds to the
social planner one (SP) defined above. The solution of the Ramsey problem for τB cannot
achieve a higher welfare than the social planner allocation because the Ramsey problem is
more restricted than the social planner problem—by equation (18).
We conjecture that the two allocation coincide. To verify this, note that the Euler
equation for the social planner problem is
u′(CSPt )C
SP
CTt
+ λSPt Σ
SP
t = λ
SP
t + β(1 + r)Et[u
′(CSPt+1)C
SP
CTt+1
+ λSPt+1Σ
SP
t+1]. (46)
It is easy to see that, if the Ramsey planner chooses
(
1 + τBt
)
in equation (18) so that
τBt = (u
′(CSPt )C
SP
CTt
)−1(λSPt Σ
SP
t − β(1 + r)Et[λSPt+1ΣSPt+1]), (47)
the Euler equations (46) and (30) become identical. It follows that the solution of the Ramsey
problem for τB and the social planner problem above coincide, and the expression (47) is
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the Ramsey optimal policy for τBt .
Moreover, since the optimal policy for τB decentralizes the social planner problem, which
is a recursive problem that can be represented by value function iteration and only depends
on the current state (
{
Bt, Y
N
t , Y
T
t
}
), the equilibrium is subgame perfect and the policy rule
(47) is time-consistent.
QED.
A.4 Optimal policy with a tax on nontradable consumption
Proof of Proposition 2 In an economy defined by (1), (4), (12) and (13) with a tax on
non-tradable consumption τNt as the government instrument, there exists a policy for τ
N
t
that decentralizes the unconstrained allocation. This policy is Ramsey optimal and time-
consistent.
PROOF: For a given state
{
Y Nt , Y
T
t , Bt
}
, let BUEt+1 be the next-period debt and P
N,UE
t the
current period relative price of non tradable goods in the economy defined by (1) and (3) but
without the credit constraint (4)—i.e., in the unconstrained economy satisfying (35)-(37).
Next, let PˆNt be the minimum price such that the credit constraint would be met if it
were present. Thus:
PˆNt = max
{
0,−B
UE
t+1 +
1−φ
φ
Y Tt
1−φ
φ
Y Nt
}
.
If we set τN such that PˆNt (1 + τ
N
t ) ≤ PN,UEt , then the credit constraint does not bind. In
other words, let τˆNt = P
N,UE
t /Pˆ
N
t − 1, then any τNt ∈ (−1, τˆNt ] would eliminate the credit
constraint (λt = 0 ∀t) if it were present, and the competitive equilibrium of the economy
would coincide with the unconstrained allocation, which eventually converges to the lower
debt bound, B.
Now, in the economy with the credit constraint, the Ramsey planner maximizes (1)
subject to (7) and (8), (22), (20), and (21). In this problem, any policy schedule such that
τNt ∈ (−1, τˆNt ] can achieve an allocation that satisfies the first order conditions (35)-(37) of
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the unconstrained allocation. Since τNt can affect the allocation only when the constraint
binds, but it is neutral when the constraint does not bind, the Ramsey planner can achieve
at best the unconstrained allocation. Thus, the tax policy τNt ∈ (−1, τˆNt ] is the optimal
solution of the Ramsey problem. Moreover, any τNt ∈ (−1, τˆNt ] is completely determined by
the current state {Bt, Y Tt , Y Nt } and therefore it is time-consistent.
QED.
A.5 Optimal policy with a tax on tradable consumption
The Ramsey problem when τTt is the policy instrument is as follows.
Definition 4 For a given {B0} and assuming that {Y Tt } and {Y Nt } are Markov processes
with finite, strictly positive support, the Ramsey problem for τTt is to choose a competitive
equilibrium that maximizes
U j ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
{
βtu (Ct)
}
,
subject to the resource constraints
CTt = Y
T
t −Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt, (48)
CNt = Y
N
t , (49)
the borrowing constraint
Bt+1 > −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
]
. (50)
the government budget constraint (16) and the first order conditions of the household
u′(Ct)CCTt
1 + τTt
= λt + β (1 + r)Et
[
u′(Ct+1)CCTt+1
1 + τTt+1
]
. (51)
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with
(1− ω) 1κ (CNt )− 1κ
ω
1
κ (CTt )
− 1
κ
=
PNt
1 + τTt
. (52)
The tax on tradable consumption affects not only the intratemporal relative price in (52),
but also the intertemporal allocation of resources in (51). Despite this difference, the next
proposition shows that it is possible to find a policy for τTt that replicates the unconstrained
allocation like in the case of the nontradable consumption tax τNt .
Proposition 3 In an economy defined by (1), (3), (15) and (16) with a tax on tradable
consumption τTt as the government instrument, there exists a policy for τ
T
t that decentralizes
the unconstrained allocation and it is time-consistent.
PROOF: Let the optimal non-tradable consumption tax be τˆNt . In the Ramsey problem
for τTt , if we set
1
1+τTt
= 1 + τNt we can achieve the unconstrained allocation, and λt ≡ 0 ∀t.
However, since τTt affects also the intertemporal allocation of resources (51) we need to show
that there is a constant τTt such that the intertemporal margin is not affected.
To do so, we first note that, by imposing λt ≡ 0 and setting τTt so that
1
1 + τTt
=
β(1 + r)Et
[
u′(CUNt+1 )C
UN
CTt+1
1+τTt+1
]
Et[u′(CUNt+1 )C
UN
CTt+1
]
, (53)
the Euler equations of the Ramsey problem and the unconstrained equilibrium coincide. It
follows that the tax rate τTt that satisfies (53) must be constant (otherwise the intertemporal
margin would be distorted).
By inspection of the unconstrained allocation, the non-tradable price has a strictly pos-
itive lower limit. Therefore there exists τT (this is, the lower level of the tax on tradables
compatible with the strictly positive lower limit on the relative price of nontradables) such
that the borrowing constraint (4) is always satisfied for any τT > τT . Thus, any constant tax
policy of the form τTt ≡ τT > τT is an optimal policy such that the competitive equilibrium
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replicates the unconstrained equilibrium. As τT is completely determined by the current
state {Bt, Y Tt , Y Nt } it is time-consistent.
QED.
A.6 Optimal policy with distortionary financing
A.6.1 Time consistency of optimal policy with two instruments
We now prove formally that the Ramsey problem with two distortionary policy instruments
is time-consistent.
Ramsey optimal policy with two distortionary policy instruments solves the following
problem:
({BRt+1}, {
(
τNt
)R}, {(τBt )R}) .= arg max
({Bt+1},{τNt },{τBt })
∞∑
t=0
βtU(CTt , C
N
t ), (54)
subject to conditions (7), (8), (20), (24) and (25) for all t = 0, 1, · · · .
The time consistent optimal policy solves the following recursive problem
(BCt+1,
(
τNt
)C
,
(
τBt
)C
)
.
= arg max
(Bt+1,τNt ,τ
B
t )
U(CTt , C
N
t ) + βV
C(Bt+1) (55)
subject to conditions (7), (8), (20), (24) and (25) at time t. Here V C(·) is the household
value function under the time consistent optimal policy, i.e.
V C =
∞∑
t=0
βtU(CTCt , C
NC
t )
where {CTCt } and {CNCt } are sequences of tradeable and nontradable consumptions based
on the time consistent optimal policy. Note that the state of economy at time t is Bt, the
current level of debt. Hence, the value function depends solely on Bt. We want to establish
that, in our economy, the Ramsey optimal policy is time consistent, i.e. BRt+1 = B
C
t+1, τ
NR
t =
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τNCt , τ
BR
t = τ
BC
t .
To prove this, we shall take the following steps. First, we show that this is the case in a
three-period version of these two problems. Second, we look at a four-period case and show
that this can be reduced to the 3-period case. Next we show that we can always reduce
an n-period case to a n − 1-period one for any n > 4. This establishes, by induction, that
in any finite-period version of our model economy the two policy regimes coincide. Finally,
under the auxiliary assumption that the period utility function and the marginal utility of
consumption are bounded in the feasible set, we prove that Ramsey optimal policy in the
finite-period model converges to Ramsey optimal policy in a infinite-horizon version of our
economy.
Three-period model We start by examining the 3-period version of the original Ramsey
optimal policy problem:
({BR′1 , BR
′
2 }, {τNR
′
0 , τ
NR′
1 }, {τBR
′
0 , τ
BR′
1 }) .=
arg max
({B1,B2},{τN0 ,τN1 },{τB0 ,τB1 })
U(CT0 , C
N
0 ) + βU(C
T
1 , C
N
1 ) + β
2V C(B2), (56)
subject to (7), (8), (20), (24) and (25) for all t = 0, 1, · · · .
It is easy to see that the only potential source of difference between the two policy
regimes comes from the Euler equation (24). In fact, when we optimizes at time t = 1 in the
time-consistent regime, we do not take into account that the choice of B2 affects the Euler
equation at time t = 0,
UCT0 (1 + τ
B
0 ) = λ0 + β(1 + r)UCT1 ,
since from (7) B2 affects UCT1 .
However this can result in differences between the two policy regimes only if B2 affects
U(CT0 ) and U(C
T
1 , C
N
1 ) + βV
C(B2) in opposite ways. Specifically, in order for the following
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two problems
max
({B1,B2},{τN0 ,τN1 },{τB0 ,τB1 })
U(CT0 , C
N
0 ) + βU(C
T
1 , C
N
1 ) + β
2V C(B2) (57)
= max
(B1,τN0 ,τ
B
0 )
U(CT0 , C
N
0 ) + β
(
max
(B2,τN1 ,τ
B
1 )
U(CT1 , C
N
1 ) + β
2V C(B2)
)
,
to coincide, it is sufficient that the following derivatives have the same sign:
∂U0(B2)
∂B2
and
∂U1(B1, B2)
∂B2
, (58)
where
U0(B2)
.
= max
(B1,τN0 ,τ
B
0 )
U(CT0 , C
N
0 ),
subject to (7), (8), (20), (24) and (25) at time t = 0, and
U1(B1, B2)
.
= max
(τN1 ,τ
B
1 )
U(CT1 , C
N
1 ) + βV
C(B2)
subject to (7), (8), (20), (24) and (25) at time t = 1.
If this restriction holds, the maximization of U1(B1, B2) with respect to B2, yields the
same optimal value of B2 that maximizes U0(B2). Therefore the maximization can be done
in a step-wise way (which gives the time consistent optimal policy) for the Ramsey program
on the left hand side of the equality (57).
Thus, in order to show that in our economy Ramsey optimal policy is time consistent we
need to establish (58). To do this, we are going to show that both U0(B2) and U1(B1, B2) are
decreasing functions of B2, given B1. In fact, it is straightforward to see that the function
U0(B2) is a decreasing function of B2, since if the household knows that in period 2 she can
borrow more, she is able to consume more in period 1, and through the Euler equation (24),
she can also consume more in period 0.
Next we want to show that U1(B1, B2) is also a decreasing function ofB2, for givenB1. Let
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B∗2 be the borrowing level in the competitive equilibrium without the borrowing constraint or
any tax intervention. So U1(B1, B2) must achieves its maximum at B
∗
2 . Therefore U1(B1, B2)
decreases for any B2 ≥ B∗2 . We shall show that BC2 ≥ B∗2 in the optimal plan that maximize
U1(B1, B2) subject to (7), (8), (20), (24) and (25) for t = 1.
We know from our optimal policy analysis on the individual tax instruments, that the
optimal policy is such that τNC1 ≤ 0 and τBC1 ≤ 0. If the borrowing constraint is not binding,
we have from the Euler equation (24) that
UCT1 (1 + τ
B
1 ) = β(1 + r)UCT2 .
And if τB1 < 0 and the B2 < B
∗
2 , we would have
UCT1 (1 + τ
B
1 ) < UCT∗1 = β(1 + r)UCT∗2 < β(1 + r)UCT2 ,
which is a contradiction.29 Therefore we conclude that if the borrowing constraint is not
binding, BC2 ≥ B∗2 .
If the constraint is binding, from the Euler equation (24) we have that λ > 0. Suppose
that B′2 ≥ B∗2 is optimal in the economy without the borrowing constraint. We want to
show that the optimal policy in the economy with the borrowing constraint has B2 ≥ B′2.
Suppose this is not the case. Then we would have
UCT1 (1 + τ
B
1 )− λ < UCT ′1 (1 + τ
B
1 ) = β(1 + r)UCT ′2
< UCT2 ,
which again contradicts the Euler equation (24).30 Therefore we must have that BC2 ≥ BC′2 ≥
B∗2 . Combining the previous two arguments, it follows that U1(B1, B2) is also a decreasing
29The first inequality comes from CT1 > C
T∗
1 and the fact that UCT1 is a decreasing function of C
T
1 . The
second inequality comes from CT2 < C
T∗
2 and the same logic.
30The inequalities follow from the same reasonings in the case of a nonbinding borrowing constraint.
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function of B and hence has the same sign of U0(B2), which proves that 58 holds.
Finite-period model Let us now look first at the case of a four-period model. We will
show that this case can be reduced to the 3-period model above. In a four-period version of
our model, the Ramsey program solves the following problem
max
({Bi}3i=1,{τNi }2i=0,{τBi }2i=0)
U(CT0 , C
N
0 ) + βU(C
T
1 , C
N
1 ) + β
2U(CT2 , C
N
2 ) + β
3V C(B3),
subject to (7), (8), (20), (24) and (25) for t = 1, · · · , 3.
Now note first that
U(CT0 , C
N
0 ) + βU(C
T
1 , C
N
1 )
is decreasing in B3 by the same reasoning as in the 3-period model, and that
U(CT2 , C
N
2 ) + βV
C(B3)
is also decreasing in B3, since B3 ≥ B∗3 where B∗3 is the competitive equilibrium borrowing
level without the borrowing constraint or tax interventions. Therefore we have that
max
({Bi}3i=1,{τNi }2i=0,{τBi }2i=0)
U(CT0 , C
N
0 ) + βU(C
T
1 , C
N
1 ) + β
2U(CT2 , C
N
2 ) + β
3V C(B3)
= max
({Bi}2i=1,{τNi }1i=0,{τBi }1i=0)
U(CT0 , C
N
0 ) + βU(C
T
1 , C
N
1 ) + β
2V C
′
(B2),
where
V C
′
(B2) = max
B3,τN2 ,τ
B
2
U(CT2 , C
N
2 ) + βV
C(B3)
subject to (7), (8), (20), (24) and (25) for t = 3. Thus, we reduced a four-period model
into a three-period model. It follows that the Ramsey optimal policy is time consistent in a
four-period version of our model.
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By using the same method, we can always reduce an n-period model into n − 1 period
model for any n > 4. By induction, therefore, we showed that the Ramsey optimal policy
for any finite-period version of our economy is time consistent.
Infinite-horizon model If we can establish the convergence of the Ramsey optimal policy
problem for a finite-period version of our model to an infinite-period version, we will have
established that Ramsey optimal policy is time consistent for (54). To do so, we need an
additional assumption, i.e. that both U(·) and UCT (·) are bounded in the feasible set.
Define now the following mapping T : Fb → Fb, where Fb is the set of bounded continuous
function defined on [B, 0]× R+,
T (V )(B, µ)
.
= min
γ≥0
max
B′,τB
U(CT , CN)− µ(1 + r)UCT + γ(UCT − λ) + βV (B′, γ),
subject to (7), (8), (20), (24) and (25).
From the assumption that both U(·) and UCT (·) are bounded, it follows that λ is bounded.
Following Marcet and Marimon (2011), we also conclude that T is a contraction mapping.
In addition, we note that T n(V )(B, 0) is the welfare function of a Ramsey optimal plan
for a n-period economy with V (·) as the final period utility. Therefore from a standard
contraction mapping argument we have that
V ∗(·) .= lim
n→∞
T n(V )(·)
is well defined and is uniformly converging. V ∗(·) will be the fixed point of the contraction
mapping and is the welfare function of the infinite-period economy under the Ramsey optimal
policy.
By the uniform convergence of the welfare function, the finite-period Ramsey optimal
policy converges to the infinite-period Ramsey optimal policy. Therefore we established that
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the Ramsey optimal policy for (54)is time consistent.
QED
A.6.2 Three distortionary policy instruments
We now focus on the case in which all three distortionary policy tools are available to the
policy maker (see (26)).
Suppose that the triplet of policy tools (τNt , τ
T
t ,τ
B
t ) can completely remove the borrowing
constraint (4). The Euler equation for this economy would be:
1 + τBt
1 + τTt
µt = β(1 + r)Et
µt+1
1 + τTt+1
. (59)
Remember now that the Euler equation for the unconstrained economy is:
µUEt = β (1 + r)Et
[
µUEt+1
]
. (60)
By comparing (59) and (60), we can see that in order to replicate the unconstrained equi-
librium the triplet of policy tools (τNt , τ
T
t ,τ
B
t ) must satisfy:
1 + τBt
1 + τTt
=
Et
µt+1
1+τTt+1
Et
[
µUEt+1
] . (61)
In addition, from the government budget constraint, we need to have
τTt
(
CTt
)UE
+ τNt
(
CNt
)UE
+ τBt B
UE
t+1 = 0. (62)
And from the borrowing constraint, we must have that
BUEt+1 ≥ −
1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt +
(
PNt
)UE
Y Nt
1 + τTt
1 + τNt
]
. (63)
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To find the tax policy {τBt , τTt , τNt } that solves (61) to (63) we proceed recursively as
follows. Denote the stochastic steady state level of debt by B, and by B0 the level of debt
in the unconstrained equilibrium at which the constraint would become binding exactly in
the constrained economy. Now define Bt = B
UE(Bt−1), where BUE(·) is the policy function
in the unconstrained equilibrium. From this policy function, we can obtain B0 > B1 >
· · · > Bt > Bt+1 > · · · > B, so that {Bk} is a debt trajectory in the unconstrained solution
starting from B0.
Starting from k = 0, for any B ∈ (B1, B0], we can compute
1 + τT (B)
1 + τN(B)
= − B
UE(B) + 1−φ
φ
Y Tt
1−φ
φ
(PNt )
UE
(B)Y Nt
from (63). Let’s set τT0 (B) ≡ 0 in that interval and use the expression above to obtain τN0 (B).
The value of τB0 (B) in the (B1, B0] interval can then be determined by the government budget
constraint (62).
Next, consider k = 1 and the associated interval (B2, B1]. Since we have already deter-
mined the value of τT0 (B) and τ
B
0 (B) for B ∈ (B1, B0], by using (61), we can obtain the
value of τT1 (B). Again by assuming the borrowing constraint (61) is binding exactly, we can
determine the value of τN1 (B). Last, by using the government budget constraint (62) we can
determine the value of τB1 (B) and update to k = 2.
By iterating recursively, we can always find the tax policy that replicates the uncon-
strained solution in an economy with the borrowing constraint.
QED
A.7 Extensions
In this section we provide details of the extensions discussed in the paper.
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A.7.1 Imperfect exchange rate intervention
Let us consider a situation in which both the capital control tax τB and the non-tradable
consumption tax τN are available to the government, and the budget is balanced with a
lump-sum tax T . However, the non-tradable consumption tax τN can be used only some of
the times, depending on the realization of an exogenous random variable εt ∈ {0, 1} that is
known to the government at the beginning of each period t. This random loss of access to τN
could capture imperfect credibility of exchange rate policy or limited availability of revenue
to implement the subsidy. With such an imperfect form of exchange rate intervention, the
household budget constraint becomes
CTt + (1 + εtτ
N
t )P
N
t C
N
t = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + Tt −Bt+1(1 + τBt ) + (1 + r)Bt;
the government budget now is
εtτ
N
t P
N
t C
N
t + τ
B
t Bt+1 = Tt;
and the non-tradable pricing equation now is
(1− ω) 1κ (CNt )−
1
κ
ω
1
κ (CTt )
− 1
κ
= (1 + εtτ
N
t )P
N
t .
In order to study this case, we proceed in two steps. We first design the optimal policy for
τNt conditional on the realization of εt and a given capital control tax τ
B. We then optimize
over τB taking into account that the optimal policy for τNt might not be always available.
Similarly to what we found in proposition 2 in the paper, optimal policy for τNt can undo
the collateral constraint. Indeed, it is straightforward to see that regardless of the policy for
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τB, the time-consistent optimal policy for τN is
τNt ∈

(
−1, τˆNt $ P
N,TC(τB)
t
PˆNt
− 1
]
, εt = 1,
any, εt = 0.

Here we have denoted with P
N,TC(τB)
t the non-tradable price under any time-consistent policy
for τB. Also
PˆNt = max
0,−B
TC(τB)
t+1 +
1−φ
φ
Y Tt
1−φ
φ
Y Nt
 ,
where B
TC(τB)
t+1 denotes borrowing under the same time-consistent policy of τ
B. Essentially,
under this policy for τN , the government can remove the borrowing constraint.
We then proceed with the second step and study the optimal policy for τB taking into
account that the optimal policy for τNt might not be always available. To do so, we transform
the optimization problem into an equivalent one in which there is only τB, the budget
balancing lump-sum tax T , and a modified version of the credit constraint:
(1− εt)
(
Bt+1 +
1− φ
φ
(Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t )
)
> 0.
This version of the borrowing constraint takes into account that, when exchange rate policy
is available, i.e. εt = 1, the constraint can be removed. A line of argument similar to the
one used in the proof of Proposition 1 in the paper can show that there exists the following
time-consistent optimal policy for τBt :
τBt = (u
′(CSP (ε)t )C
SP (ε)
CTt
)−1((1− εt)λSP (ε)t ΣSP (ε)t − β(1 + r)Et[(1− εt+1)λSP (ε)t+1 ΣSP (ε)t+1 ]),
and it coincides with the Ramsey optimal policy. Here we denoted SP (ε) as a social planner
problem in which the credit constraint binds at time t only when εt = 0. And this optimal
policy τBt achieves the allocation corresponding to SP (ε). Thus, this shows that, with
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imperfect credibility, prudential capital controls are part of the optimal policy design, like
in the case in which we have distortionary financing analyzed in the paper. Notice however
that, here, the optimal τBt depends on the likelihood that εt = 0: the higher the probability
that exchange rate policy is not available, the higher the level of τBt .
A.7.2 Borrowing constraints with pre-tax income
We first show that when the constraint is expressed in terms of post-tax income, and the
policy tools available to the Ramsey planner is τN with τNt P
N
t C
N
t = Tt, the tax/subsidy on
non-traded goods is ineffective. We have that
Bt+1 > −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt +
(
P˜Nt
)
Y Nt − Tt
]
with
P˜Nt =
(1− ω) 1κ (CNt )− 1κ
ω
1
κ (CTt )
− 1
κ
= PNt (1 + τ
N
t )
so that combining the previous two equations with the government budget constraint we
obtain
Bt+1 > −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt +
(
P˜Nt
)
Y Nt − Tt
]
=
= −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt + P
N
t (1 + τ
N
t )Y
N
t − τNt PNt CNt
]
=
= −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
]
This implies that, when the collateral depends on post tax income then any changes in τN
is neutralized by corresponding changes in the lump sum transfer/tax and it is not effective
in affecting the collateral constraint.
Here we show that, when the borrowing constraint is expressed in terms of post-tax
income, and the policy tools available to the Ramsey planner is τB with τBt Bt+1 = Tt,
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the allocation under optimal policy for this instrument is identical to the one in which the
borrowing constraint is defined in terms of pre-tax income and the instrument are τN , τBt
with τNt P
N
t C
N
t = τ
B
t Bt+1.. Rewrite the borrowing constraint as
Bt+1 > −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt +
(
P˜Nt
)
Y Nt − Tt
]
= (64)
= −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt +
(
P˜Nt
)
Y Nt − τBt Bt+1
]
where
P˜Nt =
(1− ω) 1κ (CNt )− 1κ
ω
1
κ (CTt )
− 1
κ
Now, if the borrowing constraint depends on pre-tax income and we have τNt P
N
t C
N
t =
τBt Bt+1, we can write the borrowing constraint as
Bt+1 > −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
]
= (65)
= −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt +
P˜Nt Y
N
t
(1 + τNt )
]
= −1− φ
φ
[
Y Tt +
(
P˜Nt
)
Y Nt −
τNt P˜
N
t Y
N
t
(1 + τNt )
]
where
(1− ω) 1κ (CNt )− 1κ
ω
1
κ (CTt )
− 1
κ
= P˜Nt = P
N
t (1 + τ
N
t )
Comparing (64) and (65) we can see that the two coincide since
τNt P˜
N
t Y
N
t
(1 + τNt )
= τNt P
N
t C
N
t = τ
B
t Bt+1.
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A.8 Numerical solution methods
Here we describe how we compute the different equilibria numerically. We start by rewriting
the competitive equilibrium of the model with the borrowing constraint. We can summarize
this equilibrium with the following set of nonlinear functional equations:
µ
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
= β (1 + r)E
[
µ
(
B′
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
, Y T ′, Y N ′
)]
+ max
{
λ
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
, 0
}2
µ
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
=
(
C
κ−1
κ
)(1−ρ) κ
1−κ−1
ω
1
κCT
(
B, Y T , Y N
)− 1
κ
CT
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
= (1 + r)B + Y T −B′ (B, Y T , Y N)
PN
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
=
(
1− ω
ω
) 1
κ
(
Y N
CT (B, Y T , Y N)
)− 1
κ
max
{−λ (B, Y T , Y N) , 0}2 = B′ (B, Y T , Y N)+ 1− φ
φ
Y T + PN
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
Y N),
where
C
κ−1
κ ≡
[
ω
1
κ
(
CT
(
B, Y T , Y N
))κ−1
κ + (1− ω) 1κ (Y Nt )κ−1κ ] .
We then convert the complementary slackness conditions for the borrowing constraint in
these equations into a nonlinear equation, following Garcia and Zangwill (1981).
A.8.1 The constrained and unconstrained competitive equilibrium
Given an initial guess for the marginal utility of tradable consumption tomorrow µ0
(
B′, Y T ′, Y N ′
)
,
the set of nonlinear functional equations above can be solved at each point in the state space(
B, Y T , Y N
)
to obtain an updated function µ1
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
. This process is then iterated
to convergence. We use a cubic spline to approximate the µ0
(
B′, Y T ′, Y N ′
)
function at val-
ues of B′ that are not on the grid for B. We obtain the lifetime utility in the competitive
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equilibrium using the following Bellman equation:
V CE
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
=
1
1− ρC
1−ρ + βE
[
V CE
(
B′
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
, Y T ′, Y N ′
)]
.
The allocation corresponding to the unconstrained competitive equilibrium is computed
in a similar fashion, except that the complementary slackness condition is omitted.
A.8.2 The social planning problem
The solution of the social planning problem solves the following standard dynamic program-
ming problem:
V SP
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
= max
CT ,B′,PN
{
1
1− ρC
1−ρ + βE
[
V SP
(
B′
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
, Y T ′, Y N ′
)]}
subject to
CT +B′ ≤ (1 + r)B + Y T
B′ ≥ −1− φ
φ
(
Y T + PNY N
)
PN =
(
1− ω
ω
) 1
κ
(
Y N
CT
)− 1
κ
.
Again, we approximate the value function with a cubic spline and solve the constrained op-
timization problem using feasible sequential quadratic programming with analytical deriva-
tives.
A.8.3 Markov-Perfect optimal policy
To compute the Ramsey optimal control program with two instruments we exploit time-
consistent nature of the problem and use the method proposed by Benigno et al. (2012). That
method is related to Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2009): the main difference being that the
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algorithm that we use does not require that the policy functions are differentiable (which in
general would not hold in our environment due to the occasionally-binding constraint) but
only that they are continuous.
The optimal policy problem for τN and τB is also solved iteratively. The current govern-
ment solves the following problem
V OP
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
= max
τN ,τB ,CT ,PN ,B′,µ,λ
{
1
1− ρC
1−ρ + βE
[
V OP
(
B′
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
, Y T ′, Y N ′
)]}
subject to
(1 + τB)µ = β (1 + r)E
[
µ
(
B′
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
, Y T ′, Y N ′
)]
+ max {λ, 0}2
µ =
(
C
κ−1
κ
)(1−ρ)κ−1
κ
−1
ω
1
κ
(
CT
)− 1
κ
CT = (1 + r)B + Y T −B′
PN =
(
1− ω
ω
) 1
κ
(
Y N
CT
)− 1
κ 1
1 + τN
max {−λ, 0}2 = B′ + 1− φ
φ
(
Y T + PNY N
)
0 = τNP
NY N + τBB
′ (B, Y T , Y N) .
We then guess both the continuation value function and the future marginal utility func-
tion, solve the optimization problem using feasible sequential quadratic programming with
analytical derivatives, and then update both functions to convergence.31 Both functions are
approximated with cubic splines.
We set a large number of grid points in the B dimension (1550), with most of them
concentrated at the lower end of the debt range where the constraint may bind. The joint
process for
(
Y T , Y N
)
is approximated as a Markov chain with 49 states (7 in each dimension)
using the method of Gospodinov and Lkhagvasuren (2013). Invariant distributions were
31We use analytical derivatives, particularly for the continuation value function, as numerical derivatives
produce solutions that are ”choppy” for the tax variables (but not the other endogenous variables).
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produced using the nonstochastic method from Young (2010), except for the frequency of
crises which are estimated using a simulated sample of 10, 000, 000 observations.
A.8.4 Welfare calculations
To compute the welfare equivalents, we solve the following functional equation:
V˜ CE
(
B, Y T , Y N ;χ
)
=
1
1− ρC
1−ρ + βE
[
V˜ CE
(
B′
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
, Y T ′, Y N ′;χ
)]
;
where χ is a proportional increment to tradable consumption, and the decision rules are
those from the competitive equilibrium. We use 200 grid points for χ, evenly-spaced. We
then solve the following nonlinear equations for χ
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
:
V SP
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
= V˜ CE
(
B, Y T , Y N ;χ
)
,
to obtain the welfare gain from moving to the SP allocation;
V OP
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
= V˜ CE
(
B, Y T , Y N ;χ
)
,
to obtain the welfare gain from moving to the OP allocation; and
V UA
(
B, Y T , Y N
)
= V˜ CE
(
B, Y T , Y N ;χ
)
to obtain the welfare gain from moving to the unconstrained allocation. These equations are
solved using the Brent’s method, with linear interpolation between grid points for χ.
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Table 1: Ergodic Averages
Debt to Income Prob. of Crisis Welfare Gain
CE −29.2% 6.7% NA
SP −28.4% 1.2% 0.41%
UE NA 0.0% 33.8%
OP −30.5% 4.9% 1.10%
Notes: CE denotes the competitive equilibrium allocation; SP the social planner al-
location; UE the unconstrained equilibrium; OP the optimal policy equilibrium with
both debt tax and nontradable consumption tax. The table reports ergodic means (in
percent). Welfare gains are relative to the CE and are measured in unit of tradable
consumption.
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